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Following the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center the latest, transnational terrorism 
became subject to intense academic research. Still, what determines the terrorists’ choice of 
target countries is not yet fully understood. Previous research shows that political institutions 
are important. It has been suggested, among others, that the target countries’ degree of 
democracy, electoral system, or institutional constraints to the central government are 
determinants of terror (Li and Schaub 2004, Frey and Luechinger 2004, Li 2005, Abadie 
2006).
1  
In this paper, we propose an additional institutional determinant of transnational terror: 
a target country’s degree of decentralized governance structure. According to the analysis in 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008), decentralization increases individuals’ subjective well-
being.
2 Arguably, one channel by which decentralization can increase well-being might be its 
impact on terrorism: it has been shown in Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2007) that terrorism 
reduces subjective well-being. On the other hand, Frey and Luechinger (2004) argue that the 
occurrence of terrorism is likely to be reduced by a country’s degree of decentralization. 
Consequently, one channel by which decentralization can contribute to people’s well-being 
might be its impact on terrorism.  
The theoretical arguments that explain the relation between government 
decentralization and transnational terrorism are mainly based on the system stability argument 
developed by Frey and Luechinger (2004), but also draw from the traditional public finance 
literature. According to Frey and Luechinger (2004), terrorists pursue three main goals: get 
the attention of the media, destabilize the target country’s polity, and impose damage on the 
                                                 
1 Regarding the determinants of terror in the terrorists’ countries of origin see Freytag, Krüger and Schneider 
(2006). See Krieger and Meierrieks (2008) for a recent survey on the causes of terrorism. 
2 For an exhaustive analysis of the transmission channels of fiscal decentralization – including measures of 
political and social stability – on subjective well-being in OECD countries, see Fischer (2009).    2
country’s economy. Frey and Luechinger (2004) argue that to the extent that decentralized 
countries are politically and administratively more stable than more centralized states, have 
more efficient markets, and provide less valuable symbolic targets for terrorist acts, terrorists’ 
perceived benefits of attacks decrease with government decentralization. In addition, 
according to traditional public choice arguments (Brennan and Buchanan 1980, Tiebout 
1961), decentralization might yield efficiency gains in government activities and make the 
deterrence of terror through national security policies more effective. As a consequence, the 
marginal costs of terrorism are increased, and less terrorist activities should occur in more 
decentralized countries. 
However, the beneficial impact of decentralization on terror prevention is not as 
obvious as it might look at first sight. The public finance literature also suggests that 
decentralization may harm the production of public safety. For example, decentralization may 
create coordination problems, lead to an underprovision and underfinancing of public safety, 
less policy innovation (Rose-Ackerman 1980, Strumpf 2002), and cause understaffing of 
security forces and other inefficiencies in fighting terrorism. In consequence, decentralization 
may make countries more vulnerable to terrorist attacks, as the marginal costs of committing 
terror are reduced, and we should expect transnational terrorism to be more frequent in such 
decentralized countries.  
Surprisingly, the hypothesized effects of government decentralization on terror have 
not yet been empirically tested. This omission is most likely due to the lack of adequate data 
on terrorism and political decentralization until most recently. Clearly, answering the question 
whether decentralization deters or attracts terrorists bears important policy implications. 
Answering this question is the aim of this paper. 
Specifically, the paper fills the gap in the literature by testing empirically whether and 
to what extent decentralized governance structures reduce or promote transnational terror, 
based on a panel of 109 countries over the period 1976-2000. To anticipate our main results,   3
we find that fiscal decentralization reduces the occurrence of transnational terrorist events, 
while decentralization of political-decision-making across government tiers does not appear to 
affect them. We also provide a preliminary test of a particular channel – improvements in 
government efficiency – by which fiscal decentralization might decrease terror. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section derives our hypotheses. Section 3 
describes our measures of terrorism and decentralization, while the method of estimation is 





Following the theory of rational choice, we assume that rational terrorists maximize the 
expected net benefits of their acts (see Lichbach 1987).
3 As Frey and Luechinger (2003, 2004) 
point out, the incentives of prospective terrorists depend on the (expected) costs, including 
direct and opportunity costs, and (expected) benefits of committing a terrorist act. Direct costs 
comprise, e.g., material resources needed to commit terror acts as well as time and effort 
needed in order to prepare the attack, while opportunity costs refer to alternative legal 
activities (e.g., regular employment or political engagement) potential terrorists may derive 
utility from. According to Frey and Luechinger (2004), terrorists’ expected benefits relate to 
three main goals (that serve their long-term political intentions): get the attention of the 
media, destabilize the target country’s polity, and impose damage on the target country’s 
                                                 
3 Enders and Sandler (1995) provide evidence in favour of this argument. See Schnellenbach (2006) for a recent 
discussion of terrorists’ motives.   4
economy.
4 We discuss these goals below, focusing on how decentralization affects the 
marginal costs and benefits of achieving them.  
From the terrorists’ point of view, the optimal number of attacks is determined by the 
equilibrium in which the (expected) marginal benefits are equal to the (expected) marginal 
costs of an additional terror act. The optimal number of terrorist acts decreases in the marginal 
costs and increases in the marginal benefits. In order to understand the impact of 
decentralization on terror, we have to understand the determinants or components of such 
direct costs, opportunity costs and benefits, and to what extent they are influenced by 
government structures. 
In principle, policies aiming at combating terror may well focus on increasing 
opportunity costs. By making terror less attractive as compared to alternative legal activities, 
government policies could well reduce the amount of terror. However, a target country’s 
degree of government decentralization with its political participation possibilities is unlikely 
to directly affect the opportunity costs of potential transnational, mostly foreign country-based 
terrorists. In what follows we therefore focus only on the direct costs and benefits of 
committing transnational terrorist acts.
5 
Starting with the expected benefits from committing terrorist acts, media response 
might be lower in more decentralized countries (Frey and Luechinger 2004). Media response 
arguably depends on the symbolic value of potential targets, such as government buildings or 
embassies. To the extent that decentralization reduces the symbolic value of a single target by 
                                                 
4 According to the formal model and empirical results in Rohner and Frey (2007), media attention indeed 
increases terrorism. Gassebner et al. (2007, 2008) show that terrorists are at least to some extent successful in 
destabilizing the political system, as terror attacks increase the probability of cabinet dissolutions.  
5 Relating decentralized decision-making in target countries to opportunity costs of political participation rather 
applies to domestic terrorism (Li 2005). See Schnellenbach (2006) for a recent treatment.   5
increasing the number and availability of such targets, the benefits from committing a single 
terror act are reduced.  
Regarding the terrorists’ goal of damaging the economy, Frey and Luechinger (2004) 
argue that in decentralized countries a destabilization of the market economy is more difficult 
to achieve. Arguably, the market (competition-) preserving effect of decentralization 
(Weingast 1995) may lead to larger numbers of competing suppliers, preventing 
monopolization of goods and service production. One example may be the banking system: 
the whole financial system may be at stake when a dominating financial intermediary is 
successfully attacked by terrorists, which is less likely to be the case if a sufficient number of 
competitors exist that can take over the functions of the eliminated bank. Similarly, the attack 
on the World Trade Center did have a substantial impact on the worldwide Internet traffic, as 
a main highway ran underneath the two destroyed towers. However, due to the rather 
decentralized organization of the World Wide Web, exchange of information was re-
established within few hours.   
With respect to destabilization of the polity and the political system, Frey and 
Luechinger (2004, p.511) argue that “when the government loses power, and more 
importantly, when the political system’s legitimacy is eroded, the terrorists’ chances of 
achieving their goal improve.” In principle, attacks suitable for destabilizing the politico-
administrative system may be the elimination of political key persons, attacking targets with a 
high symbolic value to undermine government’s authority, and killings of government and 
administrative personnel.
6  
In general, any governance structure that stabilizes the polity in a functional-systemic 
sense should decrease the marginal benefits of terrorist acts in terrorists’ cost-benefit analyses, 
reducing the levels of terrorist activities. Specifically, linking this hypothesis to 
                                                 
6 Examples for such targets are governors, police personnel, parliament and supreme court buildings.   6
decentralization, the authors argue that “a polity with many different centers of decision-
making and implementation is difficult, if not impossible, to destabilize” (ibidem, p.512).  
For illustration of the system-stabilizing effect of decentralization, one may think of a 
biological entity that is composed of a multitude of cells expanding into all three dimensions. 
In such multi-cell entity, the destruction of one cell does not endanger the entity as a whole, as 
the remaining cells can take over the functions of the dysfunctional one. This may be 
observable not only at the horizontal level (namely across cells at the same level), but also in 
the vertical (across layers of cells). Applying this idea to countries’ institutional settings, Frey 
and Luechinger (2004) analogously argue that lower-tier governments and administrations 
can take over responsibilities of dysfunctional – either higher-tier or other lower-tier – 
institutions. In contrast, in unitary countries non-functioning and destroyed (political and 
administrative) centers are likely to lead to country-wide collapse. As examples, Frey and 
Luechinger (2004) compare the situation in the centralized country Armenia in 1999 to that of 
the decentralized Swiss state Zug in 2001. In both entities a substantial number of members of 
the executive and the legislating body were killed by terrorists. While in centralized Armenia 
a “political vacuum” was created that threatened the “internal and external security of the 
state” (p.513), in decentrally organized Zug the heads of the quite autonomous lower-tier 
communes were able to take over some of the state parliaments’ functions.  
Thus, decentralization may stabilize the polity by reducing the damage terror may 
exert on a country’s ability to govern its affairs, letting decentralized countries recover more 
quickly. This feature of a decentralized governance structure decreases terrorists’ expected 
benefits with respect to targeted political destabilization. Consequently, Frey and Luechinger 
(2004) argue that ‘spatial decentralization’ – that relates to some kind of vertical division 
between various tiers of government, both of ‘decision-making’ power – but equally of 
‘implementation’ power – deters terror.    7
In addition, decentralization is also likely to affect the marginal costs of terrorism. 
Supporters argue that decentralization of the politico-administrative system makes 
governments more efficient and more effective in the provision of public goods – one of the 
governments’ core responsibilities (Musgrave 1959). The economic theory of bureaucracy 
and the literature on institutional competition demonstrate that competition among public 
agencies reduces bureaucratic waste (e.g., Niskanen 1971), improves respect for regional 
differences in societal conditions of generating public safety (Tiebout 1961), serves as an 
information discovery procedure (Hayek 1968), strengthens democratic control over 
government spending activities ("voice"), and protects the interests of local minorities by 
facilitating "exit" (Hirschman 1970). Decentralization forces politicians to compete, leading 
to stronger local democracy, political accountability, and thus, citizens’ control over the 
provision of public goods (Betz 1996). Decentralization thus permits dissenting residents to 
escape local security policies they do not agree to by moving to a different jurisdiction in a 
Tiebout fashion (Tiebout 1961), inducing incentives for competing local governments to 
innovate, to work efficiently and to target their security policies effectively (Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980).
7  
Taken all together, these arguments suggest that decentralization improves security 
policies, lets media attention become more difficult to achieve, and stabilizes the market 
economy and the political system. Hence, we expect decentralization to make terrorists’ 
activities more costly and to decrease their benefits (in expected terms), reducing the optimal 
level of terror. Taken together, these considerations lead to our first hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Decentralization reduces the number of terrorist incidents. 
 
                                                 
7 Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006) show that policy innovation might occur more frequently in decentralized 
systems once politicians’ electoral motives are taken into account.   8
The impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror is, however, not as 
obvious as it might look at first sight. Applying alternative public choice arguments that relate 
to the quality of public safety, decentralization might create coordination problems which may 
delay or prevent reforms, thus making terror prevention less effective.
8 Moreover, 
institutional constraints imposed by the division of powers in decentralized countries might 
significantly weaken the federal and local governments’ ability to fight terror. More 
specifically, horizontal information externalities might imply the underprovision of policy 
innovation, preventing sensible institutional reforms that may aggravate these coordination 
problems and inefficiencies (Rose-Ackerman 1980, Strumpf 2002). This argument is familiar 
from the literature on crisis resolution: referring to the consequences of hurricane “Katrina” in 
New Orleans in August 2005, e.g., Congleton (2006) stresses the role of decentralized 
structures. According to Congleton (p. 14), “it is clear that in practice the overlapping fiscal 
and production responsibilities of national, state, and local agencies also create new 
coordination and free-rider problems within the flood control and emergency response 
systems as a whole.” Consequently, the marginal costs of destabilizing and damaging a 
country’s political system and economy decrease.
9 
In a similar vein, it is argued that competition between jurisdictions might cause a 
“race to the bottom,” driving local tax rates below the level necessary to sufficiently finance 
public safety, leading to its underprovision. In general, small-sized jurisdictions might prevent 
internalization of positive externalities across jurisdictions created by locally produced public 
                                                 
8 Prud’homme (1995) and Sewell (1996) provide empirical support for this view.  
9 Admittedly, the argument that decentralization may cause coordination failures and thereby undermines 
security provision is hard to tackle empirically. Even in decentralized countries security may be provided by the 
central government. Moreover, even if security is provided by the central government, there may be a multitude 
of different agencies providing security services with associated coordination problems. Examples are the 
various intelligence agencies in the U.S., the U.K. and France.   9
safety and, thus, lead to understaffing of security forces. Consequently, decentralized 
governance structures might allow foreign terrorists to organize and manoeuvre more easily, 
so that destabilizing the economy and the political system becomes easier. As damage is 
easier to achieve, the marginal costs of transnational terrorist activity are reduced.
10  
In addition, according to Li (2005), the abundance of suitable targets for terrorist acts 
makes it potentially easier for terrorists to threaten a country’s population: when a country’s 
number and availability of ‘symbolic’ targets increase in its degree of political and fiscal 
decentralization, such country may become a more attractive target for foreign terrorists, as 
targets with lower direct costs of attack can be chosen. Moreover, media attention might be 
easier to get: as argued above, on the one hand, the value of each particular target is likely to 
decrease with the number of available targets, lowering media response. However, on the 
other hand, the number of targets might be larger in decentralized countries. When the effect 
of the latter exceeds that of the former, decentralization might not decrease media attention, 
but might even increase it. 
Taken together, decentralization may make countries more vulnerable to foreign 
terrorists’ activities, reducing (increasing) their expected marginal costs (benefits) of 
committing an additional terror act. Hence, we should expect transnational terror to be more 
frequent in such decentralized countries. We thus hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Decentralization increases the number of terrorist incidents. 
 
 
Overall, the main arguments suggesting that decentralization might affect terror can be 
summarized under two headings: the first set of arguments relate to the stability of the target 
                                                 
10 As one example, one might think of the coordination failure between the various state and federal institutions 
in the U.S. that prevented an early detection of the World Trade Center attacks in the planning phase.   10
country’s polity, and how it may deter terror (‘system stability hypothesis’), whereas the 
second set builds on government efficiency and effectiveness arguments regarding the 
provision of public safety (‘efficiency hypothesis’). While the main part of our empirical 
analysis below aims to test the relation between decentralization and the occurrence of 
transitional terror, the second part provides a preliminary attempt to determine the reasons for 




3. Measuring Decentralization and Terror 
Frey and Luechinger (2004, p.512) discuss the effects of two forms of decentralization – 
decentralization of ‘policy implementation’ and of ‘political decision-making’. Thus, their 
notion of decentralization captures the two separate, but inseparable dimensions of 
‘federalism’ as defined by, e.g., Keman (2000) or Brennan and Buchanan (1980). According 
to Keman (2000), federalist structures comprise decentralization with respect to “the right to 
act,” on the one hand, and “the right to decide,” on the other.
11 In general, political scientists 
seem to agree that federal structures include “a set of jurisdictional arrangements for 
allocating policy responsibilities between different levels of government; this refers to both 
policy-making and policy implementation.” (Italics by us) (Obinger et al., 2005, p.9).  
In contrast, Frey and Luechinger (2004) argue that decision-making and policy 
implementation constitute two separate dimensions of a well-functioning decentralized 
system. Thus, our analysis accounts for these two types of decentralization separately. 
Specifically, we distinguish between decentralization in government spending and local 
political autonomy. The first most closely reflects the implementation of government policies 
                                                 
11 Similarly, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) define ’federalism’ to comprise the two dimensions: (i) joint 
assignment of functions and (ii) taxing power of lower levels of government.    11
through executing administrations and public goods creation (“the right to act”), while ‘local 
political autonomy’ refers to the presence of political decision- and law-making power at the 
local level (“the right to decide”). In political science, this latter concept is also referred to as 
‘decision decentralization’ or ‘local autonomy’ (e.g., Treisman 2002).  
We employ two measures of decentralization obtained from Treisman (2008), a 
collection of various indicators of decentralization. Fiscal decentralization is measured 
employing data from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), as presented in a 
dataset compiled by the World Bank.
12 The numerator of this measure is total expenditure of 
sub-federal government tiers, while the denominator is total spending by all levels of 
government.
13 Data are employed for the period 1976-2000 for a maximum of 109 
countries.
14 Among the countries in our sample, expenditure decentralization is in the range of 
1.65 to 55.62 percent. On average, 21.48 percent of government spending takes place at the 
sub-federal level (median: 20.27 percent). 
As proxy for political autonomy at the sub-federal level, we employ a dichotomous 
time-invariant indicator that takes the value ‘one’ if second tier governments “have autonomy 
in certain specified areas – i.e., constitutional authority to legislate – not explicitly subject to 
central laws,” [Italics by us] equally collected around 1996-2000 and obtained from the 
Treisman cross-sectional dataset  (Treisman 2002, 2008). In other words, political autonomy 
is assumed to exist when the federal constitution stipulates that laws of the second tier cannot 
be overruled or constrained by framework legislation by the federal government (Riker 
                                                 
12 See http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm (July 6, 2007). 
13 The Treisman data provide an alternative measure of fiscal decentralization, often employed in the literature 
on federalism that relates to decentralization of revenue. Revenue decentralization is highly correlated with 
expenditure decentralization (ρ = 0.91). Inclusion of both measures of fiscal decentralization shows the 
dominance of expenditure decentralization over revenue decentralization.  
14 Selection of countries and years is driven by data availability.   12
1964).
15 In the dataset, prominent examples of such autonomous sub-federal entities are the 
Indian states, the Canadian provinces and the Swiss ‘cantons’, in contrast to the German 
‘Laender’, where only policing and schooling are truly independent state responsibilities. 
Notably, this measure of political autonomy is based on the mere reading of constitutional 
stipulations, does not differentiate by area of policy-making, and, thus, may not necessarily 
reflect its importance in actual political decision-making (Treisman 2002). Among our sample 
of countries, about 16 percent are coded as federal with politically autonomous sub-federal 
tiers.  
However, note that despite the fact that our measure of expenditure decentralization 
seems to be those used most widely in empirical cross-national studies on the effects of fiscal 
centralization (e.g., Lijphart 1977, Fisman and Gatti 2002),
16 it is not free of problems. 
Kessing, Konrad and Kotsogiannis (2006) provide a summary: first, the sources of the 
revenues, intergovernmental transfers, and other grants are not taken into account. Second, 
our measure of fiscal decentralization does not account for the extent to which the 
jurisdictions’ tax bases overlap.
17 Third and most importantly, it reflects only the distribution 
of spending responsibilities but does not contain information about the distribution of political 
power among the central and sub-national governments. It is for this reason we add a measure 
of political autonomy separately to our model.  
                                                 
15 The Treisman (2002) data provides an alternative, weaker measure of local political autonomy, which only 
includes cases of so-called ‘residual’ autonomy, where political decisions at the local level fill the legal gaps in 
national framework laws, and may be overruled by national legislation. We test for the impact of modifying our 
measure of political decentralization in the robustness section below.  
16 While this is true for cross-country studies, other political institutions such as direct democracy may be more 
important for the provision of public goods at the state level within a country. For example, Fischer (2005) 
investigates whether direct democracy restricts the Leviathan-like behavior of bureaucracies using an index of 
direct democracy developed in Stutzer (1999). 
17 See Treisman (2002) and Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) for a more detailed discussion.   13
Turning to our measure of terrorist activity, we employ data provided in the MIPT 
Terrorism Knowledge Base.
18 The Terrorism Knowledge Base integrates data from the 
RAND Terrorism Chronology and RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident databases, the Terrorism 
Indictment database, and DFI International's research on terrorist organizations.
19  
The Terrorism Knowledge Base defines terror rather broadly as (the threat of) 
violence aimed at creating fear and alarm.
20 Most of these terrorist acts are directed against 
civilian targets; unlike for other types of crime, terrorists usually claim credits for their acts. 
All terrorist acts, both domestic and transnational, are included in the database irrespective of 
the identity of the committing group or their long-term goals. In this paper, we focus on 
incidences of transnational terrorism. According to MIPT, transnational terror events are 
defined according to (1) the provenience of the terrorist or their group, or (2) the nature of the 
terrorists’ targets. Thus, transnational terrorism involves either terrorists acting in a foreign 
country, domestic targets that are associated with a foreign country (such as embassies), or 
targets of an international character (such as airplanes or UN-related entities). According to 
this definition, attacks committed by local residents against their own governments are only 
defined as transnational terror events in case they occur in the name of an internationally 
working network of terrorists, such as, e.g., Al Qaeda. In contrast, attacks by foreigners would 
always be counted as ‘transnational’ incidences.
21 
                                                 
18 Available at: http://www.mipt.org (20 Feb 2009). 
19 There are several sources for terrorism data. We choose MIPT because it combines various sources and thus 
provides extensive country and yearly coverage. For a detailed discussion on the measurement of terrorism see 
Frey and Luechinger (2005). 
20 See the glossary that accompanies the MIPT database for a detailed definition. See also Enders and Sandler 
(1999, 2002).  
21 The definition of MIPT for transnational events is close to that of Sandler and Enders (2004), who base it on 
either the terrorist group’s international ramifications or its foreign interest as target.   14
We extract the number of transnational terror events for each country and year.
22 
Given that the database covers the whole world, we assign ‘zeros’ to all countries and years 
with no recordings. According to our sample of 109 countries from 1976-2000, the number of 
terrorist events per country during the total sample period varies from 0 to 50 with an average 
of about 1.70 (or 4.57 for those country-year observations with positive values). Altogether, 
there were 710 country-years with actual incidences of transnational terror in our panel (and 
1911 country-year observations altogether). 
Figure 1 shows how the world average of terror events has evolved over time.
23 As 
can be seen, the average number of transnational terror events fluctuates around the mean 
from 1971 to roughly the early nineties, then slightly declines, and rises sharply again after 
2000. We have to restrict our sample to the period prior to the year 2001 because data for our 
focal determinant, fiscal decentralization, is only available until 1999/2000.  
 





























                                                 
22 Territories are assigned to the country formally governing the territory; if no assignment is possible, the 
observations are excluded from the sample (e.g. Kashmir and the Persian Gulf). 
23 For time-series studies on the occurrence and distribution of terrorism see Enders and Sandler (2005, 2006).   15
4. Method 
We estimate random effects panel regressions for non-negative count data. The data extend to 
a maximum of 109 countries and cover the years 1976-2000. Since some of the data are not 
available for all countries or years, the panel data are unbalanced and the number of 
observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables. As our data on terror events are 
strongly skewed to the right (with an accumulation of observations at zero) and display 
significant overdispersion (with the variance being greater than the mean), we estimate our 
regressions employing the Negative Binomial estimator. 
We estimate the following relationship: 
(1)  ) , , ( 1 , 1 , , t t i t ji t i X decent F terror λ − − = ,  
where terrori,t represents the number of recorded transnational terror events in country 
i in period t, and decentji,t-1 is our j
th (lagged) measure of decentralization. Xi,t-1 is the vector of 
(lagged) control variables, and λt are time fixed effects. The low correlation between political 
autonomy and fiscal decentralization should allow to identify their individual effects when 
jointly included.
24 As the local autonomy measure shows no time series variation, the model 
is estimated with random effects. Note that the Hausman test favours this model over pooled 
Negative Binomial Regressions. When employing country fixed effects (and omitting local 
autonomy) as test for robustness, the main results for expenditure decentralization are 
unchanged, as shown below (in the section on robustness, Table 2). 
Note that our analysis focuses on the target countries of transnational terrorism rather 
than its countries of origins. In choosing our control variables, we thus follow Dreher and 
Gassebner (2008) who equally aim at analyzing terror in target countries.
25 We employ GDP 
per capita (measured in constant 2000 US$). On the one hand, richer countries are more 
                                                 
24 The correlation coefficient between political autonomy and fiscal decentralization is 0.4. 
25 The Appendix reports all variables employed with their sources and descriptive statistics.   16
attractive targets for terrorists, as terror creates more media attention. On the other hand, 
richer countries can afford more effective police and intelligence agencies, potentially being 
better able to prevent terror. The impact of per capita GDP is thus not obvious a priori. 
A second variable suggested to be important for terror is the extent of civil liberties, 
comprising political participation possibilities and aspects of economic and social freedom 
(see Freedom House 2005). In the context of transnational terrorism, civil liberties most likely 
increase terror. Strongly democratic, economically liberal, mostly Western countries may 
attract transnational terrorist activities as they symbolize such ‘civil liberties’. In addition, 
politically free countries are frequently also allies of the United States and are thus brought in 
association with its propagated values. Before 1990, democratic countries would have been 
chosen as preferred targets particularly by pro-communist groups, while, nowadays, after the 
breakdown of communist regimes, mainly violent anti-Western, pro-Islamic or anti-
globalization groups may choose them as preferred targets.
26  
However, repressive states might be better able to suppress terror, e.g., through 
constraining the media echo or generating high levels of public safety (a prominent example 
is China).
27 On the other hand, transnational terror may even be attracted by the absence of 
political rights, possibly being correlated with being in a state of political system transition or 
decay, with dysfunctioning government administrations and less effective public safety 
                                                 
26 Our model does not include a squared term of civil liberties, following Dreher and Gassebner (2008). When 
we include the squared term of the civil liberties variable in addition, the level and squared term are not 
individually significant at conventional levels. While this is contrary to Abadie (2006), our results regarding the 
effect of fiscal and political decentralization on terrorism do not depend on whether or not we include a quadratic 
term. 
27 There is also literature relating political participation to the local residents’ willingness to support terror 
groups. Arguably, this argument is more likely to hold for domestic terrorism, interpreting terror as form of 
‘expressive’ voting (see, e.g., Frey and Luechinger 2003, 2004, Li 2005, Li and Schaub 2005).   17
provision. Decreasing the costs of terror acts, such countries are more likely to become 
preferred targets, particularly if, despite the institutional decay, considerable media response 
can be expected (a prominent example is Iraq).
28 In line with Piazza (2006) and Dreher and 
Gassebner (2008), we include both the level of and changes in political freedom. 
Third, we include population size, as in larger countries transnational attacks might 
attract greater international media attention. Furthermore, the costs of state surveillance and 
policing arguably rise with population size, leading to lower levels of public safety (Piazza 
2006).  
Fourth, we include government fractionalization. According to Piazza (2006), to some 
extent the number of parties in power proxies for “social cleavage,” potentially giving rise to 
terror: domestic social cleavages and lesser social cohesion, lowering social capital such as 
careful neighborhood watching and social control (Putnam 2000), might reduce the costs of 
transnational terrorism. On the other hand, fractionalized coalition governments may 
represent a larger number of social groups compared to a single party government (Lijphart 
1977), decreasing social tensions in society and, thus, contributing to system stability which 
reduces transnational terrorists’ expected benefits.  
Finally, we include data on voting coincidence with the U.S. in the United Nations 
General Assembly as provided by Voeten (2004). As shown in Dreher and Gassebner (2008), 
countries voting more frequently in line with the U.S. in the Assembly are more likely to 
become victims of terror. This effect may be particularly strong for transnational terror, where 
foreign terrorists may attack the more vulnerable allied countries as substitute for the better 
                                                 
28 Sandler (1995) provides an excellent discussion of the early literature on the relationship between democracy 
and (domestic) terror. Iraq is a present-time example of the relation between missing political freedom and 
‘imported’ transnational terrorism. The occupation by the USA guarantees considerable media attention in a 
country apparently serving as battle field for neighboring countries’ terror groups fighting for regional 
hegemony.   18
protected and less accessible USA. We follow Thacker (1999), coding votes in agreement 
with the U.S. as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions or absences as 0.5. The 
resulting numbers are then divided by the total number of votes in each year. This results in a 
variable ranging from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating total disagreement with the U.S., and 1 
showing full agreement. 
Data for GDP per capita and population size are taken from the World Bank (2006). 
Government fractionalization is from Beck et al. (2001) and measures the probability that two 
randomly drawn members from among the government are of different parties. Level and 
change in political freedom are based on the average of the two political rights and civil 
liberties indices from Freedom House (2005), with levels measured on a scale from -7 (low) 





5.1 Baseline Model 
Table 1 shows the results. We first include fiscal decentralization and political autonomy 
separately (columns 1 and 2), while column 3 includes them jointly. All models include 
dummies for each year, which are always jointly significant at the one percent level. Overall, 
our results for the control variables mirror those reported in Piazza (2006) and Dreher and 
Gassebner (2008). As can be seen, the number of terror events increases with larger 
population, possibly reflecting greater social and ethnic cleavages but also larger international 
media response. (However, it may well reflect a simple scale effect, as larger countries 
experience more terror events, c.p.) The coefficient of population size is significant at least at 
the five percent level, while the impact of government fractionalization is marginally   19
insignificant according to the full model of column 3, but significant at the five percent level 
at least in columns 1 and 2. In two of the three specifications, terror also rises with the level of 
civil liberties and greater voting coincidence with the U.S. in the UN General Assembly, at 
least at the ten percent level of significance. As argued before, both may capture the proximity 
of a country’s democratic value system and foreign policy to that of the U.S., making the 
country a ‘substitute target’, but with possibly lower ‘entry’ costs. GDP per capita is not 
consistently significant at conventional levels, which is in line with Krueger and Malečková 
(2003) and Abadie (2006). Changes in political freedom have no significant impact on terror 
according to all specifications. 
Turning to our variables of primary interest, the results show a significant effect of 
expenditure decentralization on transnational terror, at the ten percent level of significance in 
column 1, and at the one percent level according to the full model of column 3. Our results 
show that more spending responsibilities for local governments reduce the number of terror 
events in the target country. This result is in line with our a priori hypothesis regarding the 
division of administrative and executing responsibilities across government tiers. Calculating 
the marginal effect of fiscal decentralization for the full model (column 3), the results show 
that, evaluated at the sample mean, the number of terror events declines by 0.03 events with 
an increase in decentralization by one percentage point.
29 To illustrate the quantitative impact, 
we also calculate the effect of raising the share of sub-federal spending from 20% to 50% 
(which is realistic given the variation in our regression sample from 1.5% to 55.6%). 
                                                 
29 Note that the coefficients of the non-linear Negative Binomial Regression model do not correspond to the 
marginal effects. While incidence ratios can directly be calculated as the exponential value of the respective 
coefficient, rather than reporting incidence ratios, we use the mfx command of Stata 10.1 to calculate the 
marginal effects of decentralization, at the mean of all explanatory variables and assuming the random effects to 
be zero. To calculate the predicted number of terror attacks for varying degrees of decentralization, the 
remaining determinants are equally fixed at their mean values.   20
Calculating the predicted number of terror events with a value for decentralization of 20% (at 
the mean of all other variables) results in 1.49 attacks. Calculating the predicted number for a 
share of sub-federal spending of 50% reduces this number by almost half to 0.76 attacks. 
Clearly, this impact is quantitatively relevant and bears important welfare implications.
30  
The results of columns 2 and 3 also show that local political autonomy in its strong 
form does not affect the number of terror events, neither when included separately nor jointly 
with fiscal decentralization.
31 This conclusion holds when applying a definition of political 
autonomy of a weaker type, as shown in the robustness section below. Our findings contradict 
the hypothesis that more political autonomy deters terrorism. Potentially, the insignificance of 
political autonomy might be caused by two opposing effects: on the one hand, local political 
decision-making power might well decrease terrorists’ expected net benefits through 
increased political stabilization, or enhancements of local public safety provision, as discussed 
above (Frey and Luechinger 2004); on the other hand, a politically decentralized government 
may also reduce terrorists’ costs, e.g., by providing more numerous potential symbolic-
bearing targets for terrorist attacks, as Li (2005) argues. Both effects may neutralize each 
other, but, unfortunately, cannot be disentangled. Notably, we cannot rule out the explanation 
that the insignificance is caused by a constitution-based definition of political autonomy 
which bears little importance in a real-life political economy context.  
In summary, we find strong support for the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization is 
negatively associated with the occurrence of transnational terror events, while there is no 
effect of decentralized political decision-making.    
  
 
                                                 
30 See Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2009) for an attempt to measure the welfare costs of terrorism. 
31 Results are qualitatively identical when a Tobit model is estimated or a dichotomous variable of the 
occurrence of transnational terror is analyzed with Logit estimation. Results are available on request.   21
Table 1: Decentralization and Terror, NBR, 1976-2000  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fiscal decentralization (t-1) -0.015* -0.022*** -0.040*** 0.007
[1.82] [2.65] [4.12] [0.71]
Political autonomy 0.321 0.139 -0.378 0.214
[1.43] [0.49] [1.29] [0.71]
(log) GDP per capita (t-1) 0.219** 0.104 0.174 0.132 0.187
[2.13] [1.44] [1.59] [1.01] [1.32]
(log) Population (t-1) 0.462*** 0.160** 0.407*** 0.625*** 0.099
[4.98] [2.48] [3.85] [5.24] [0.91]
Political freedom (t-1) 0.104* 0.034 0.151** 0.216*** -0.051
[1.71] [0.81] [2.25] [2.61] [0.49]
Political freedom, change -0.002 -0.102 0.013 0.065 0.037
[0.01] [1.31] [0.10] [0.34] [0.18]
Government fractionalization (t-1) 0.538** 0.548*** 0.418 0.601* -0.162
[2.27] [3.20] [1.62] [1.77] [0.41]
Voting with U.S. (t-1) 1.458** 0.557 1.524** 2.399** -0.714
[2.05] [1.03] [2.04] [2.50] [0.62]
Constant -10.735*** -3.223** -9.220*** -12.962*** -5.720**
[5.34] [2.31] [3.99] [4.84] [2.26]
Observations 934 1911 826 826 826
Dependent variable all terror all terror all terror severe terror less severe terror
Number of countries 76 109 63 63 63
Wald test (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
All regressions include year fixed effects.
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is the number of transnational terror events in a particular year and country. 
Column 4 (5) focuses on severe (less severe) events.  A terror event is defined as severe when at least one 





Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 provide further analyses of the baseline model by distinguishing 
terror events that can be considered to be marginal from those which are severe. For the latter, 
we count all terrorist events in which at least one person was physically harmed – namely all 
events in which the number of persons killed or injured was greater than zero. Of course, it is 
debatable which threshold constitutes a severe event. Following Dreher, Gassebner and Siemers 
(2010), we choose the lowest threshold possible. While this may be the most simple/intuitively 
appealing choice from our point of view, we are clearly aware that even ‘less severe’ events   22
may still have a major psychological or economic impact on the population as, e.g., the London 
bombings of July 21, 2005.  
  Splitting up the type of terror events by severe and less severe incidences may allow us 
to draw preliminary conclusions with respect to whether the ‘efficiency hypothesis’ or the 
‘system stability hypothesis’ of decentralization drives our results. Arguably, the severity of the 
terrorist attack is to some extent under terrorists’ control.
32 When decentralization increases 
government efficiency in combating terror acts – raising terrorists’ marginal costs – both severe 
and less severe terror acts should be reduced more or less equally. However, with respect to 
politico-administrative stability, system destabilization is most likely be triggered by severe 
attacks – particularly assassinations of political leaders and killings of government personnel, as 
Frey and Luechinger (2004)’s examples of Zug and Armenia suggest. From this viewpoint, the 
system-stabilizing effect of decentralization should only affect the marginal benefits derived 
from severe attacks, but not that from less severe terrorist acts.  
  Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 suggest that the overall results observed for all types of 
terror events in columns 1 and 3 are entirely driven by severe events. Significant at the 1 
percent level, fiscal decentralization reduces the number of severe terror events, but does not 
affect less severe events at conventional levels of significance. While this result might thus be 
interpreted to be more in favour of the ‘system stability’ rather than the ‘government 
efficiency’ hypothesis, in principle, other interpretations are also possible. We will return to 
an attempt to directly address the ‘efficiency hypothesis’ below.  
  According to the marginal effects corresponding to the results of column 4 (again 
calculated at the mean of the explanatory variables), an increase in fiscal decentralization by 1 
percentage point reduces the number of severe terror events by 0.15 events, which is 
                                                 
32 Of course, this does not imply that terrorists can always choose the degree of damage resulting from their 
attack. For example, an attempted severe bombing might have no physical and, thus, destabilizing effect when 
the bomb is deactivated early enough. In this case, such attempt would be counted as less severe terror event.   23
quantitatively about 5 times larger as compared to the effect for the overall sample. Predicting 
the number of attacks following a simulated rise in the degree of expenditure decentralization 
from 20% to 50%, predicted severe terror would decrease by roughly 2.7 events, from 3.9 
events down to 1.2 events. Compared to the effect of fiscal decentralization on all terror 
events (column 3), the impact on severe events is more than quadruple in size (-0.63 versus 
-2.7).  
Table 2 tests for the robustness of our results to the inclusion of additional variables 
that have been proposed as determinants of terror in the previous literature or are intuitively 
appealing as such. As in Piazza (2006) and Dreher and Gassebner (2008), we test for the 
sensitivity of the estimates to the inclusion of population growth and GDP growth. According 
to Piazza (2006), the first puts pressure on a countries’ economic and political system, 
increasing the destructive impact of an attack on the polity, thereby increasing terrorists’ 
expected benefits. However, GDP growth may equally well be correlated with reductions in 
poverty, potentially increasing terrorists’ costs through improved government effectiveness. 
We will turn to the role of governance quality below. In addition to government 
fractionalization that is included in the main regression, we also test for the impact of four 
alternative measures of ‘social cleavage’ that make the polity more vulnerable to attacks: 
ethnic fractionalization, language fractionalization, religious fractionalization, and 
fractionalization of the parliamentary opposition. Similarly, recently founded states might 
have still weak and ineffective institutions, contributing to their system instability and 
insufficient public goods provision. We therefore add an index for ‘new states’.
33 We also 
include a dichotomous variable that takes the value ‘one’ if the country is in a state of internal 
or external war. Again, in analogy to the previous argument, we can expect government 
institutions to not work well and basic human rights to be severely constrained at times of 
                                                 
33 Following Gallup et al. (2001) the index is ‘0’ for states not existing before 1914, ‘1’ when created between 
1914 and 1945, ‘2’ when created between 1946 and 1989, and ‘3’ when created after 1989.   24
war, giving rise to system instability, promising greater damage and decreasing costs of terror 
acts. We also test for the hypothesis that inertia may play a role by adding the lagged 
dependent variable on the right hand side of the equation.
34 
The Treisman data provides an alternative index of weaker political local autonomy, 
which measures so-called ‘residual’ autonomy, where political decisions at the local level fill 
the legal gaps in national laws, and may be overruled by national legislation.
35 In order to 
capture both strong and weak forms of local political autonomy, we combine this index with 
the one on strong political autonomy already used above to obtain a more general local 
autonomy indicator. We replace the (strong) local autonomy dummy used in Table 1 with this 
variable to test for the robustness of our results. 
As final test for robustness, we estimate our original specification of column 1 in 
Table 1 employing a fixed rather than a random effects model.
36 
As can be seen from columns 1-8 of Table 2, most of the additional variables are 
completely insignificant. The exceptions are the war dummy and the index for new states that 
are significant at the five percent level, with a positive and, respectively, a negative 
coefficient. Column 9 includes the lagged dependent variable as measure of inertia, which is 
significant at the 1 percent level, with a positive coefficient.
37 Column 10 reports the results 
replacing the previously employed strong ‘political autonomy’ with the combined measure 
                                                 
34 Note that the bias detected by Hurwicz (1950) is sufficiently small to justify non-instrumentation of the lagged 
dependent variable with a time-series dimension of about 30 years. 
35 A prominent example of such political autonomy is the German Laender. For other examples see Bjørnskov, 
Dreher and Fischer (2008). 
36 Note that we use the unconditional Negative Binomial Regression estimator with dummy variables to 
represent the fixed country effects. Unlike for Logit estimations, e.g., there is no incidental parameter bias in the 
coefficients of the Negative Binomial Regression (Allison and Waterman 2002). 
37 This result holds when OLS is applied.    25
that also accounts for weaker forms of local political autonomy, as described above. It is not 
significant at conventional levels.  
As shown in column 11, the effect of decentralization on terror prevails when the 
model is estimated employing country fixed effects rather than random effects.
38 Moreover, in 
all specifications of Table 2 the negative impact of expenditure decentralization on terror 
stays significant at least at the five percent level. Its coefficient is of similar size across all 
estimated models, including the country fixed effects specification, which shows that 
decentralization is not strongly correlated with any of these new determinants added to the 
model or other, unobserved, country characteristics. The main findings equally prevail when, 
alternatively, Tobit and Logit estimators are applied (not reported).
39  
We conclude that fiscal decentralization robustly decreases terror, independent of the 
choice of control variables and method of estimation.
40  
 
                                                 
38 Note that this holds for all models of Table 1, including and excluding fiscal decentralization.  
39 Tobit models do not take account of the (count) structure of the data, while Logit cannot use information 
contained in the frequency of attacks but reduces this information to a binary dependent variable, indicating the 
occurrence of terror instead. 
40 We also replicated the analysis for a sample of countries without political autonomy. The results are not 
affected.   26
Table 2: Decentralization and Terror, NBR, 1976-2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Fiscal decentralization (t-1) -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.019** -0.021** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.020** -0.022*** -0.031**
[2.64] [2.62] [2.77] [2.25] [2.48] [2.95] [2.65] [2.75] [2.52] [2.59] [1.96]
Political autonomy 0.139 0.139 0.172 0.266 0.095 0.226 0.131 0.259 0.275
[0.49] [0.49] [0.58] [0.96] [0.32] [0.79] [0.46] [0.83] [1.01]
Strong or residual autonomy 0.047
[0.16]
(log) GDP per capita (t-1) 0.185* 0.174 0.056 0.165 0.196 0.099 0.177 0.064 0.194* 0.18 0.715
[1.68] [1.58] [0.47] [1.57] [1.63] [0.83] [1.59] [0.53] [1.84] [1.58] [1.38]
(log) Population (t-1) 0.411*** 0.407*** 0.331*** 0.356*** 0.413*** 0.441*** 0.409*** 0.363*** 0.379*** 0.419*** 0.364
[3.90] [3.85] [3.02] [3.41] [3.87] [4.15] [3.85] [2.94] [3.78] [3.86] [0.41]
Political freedom (t-1) 0.150** 0.151** 0.159** 0.191*** 0.159** 0.130* 0.153** 0.155* 0.130** 0.154** 0.221**
[2.23] [2.24] [2.35] [2.80] [2.29] [1.89] [2.25] [1.89] [1.99] [2.30] [2.51]
Political freedom, change 0.019 0.013 -0.025 0.010 0.019 0.012 0.014 -0.034 0.014 0.013 0.059
[0.14] [0.10] [0.19] [0.07] [0.14] [0.09] [0.10] [0.24] [0.10] [0.10] [0.46]
Government fractionalization (t-1) 0.413 0.417 0.377 0.373 0.406 0.448* 0.420 0.530* 0.292 0.413 0.311
[1.60] [1.62] [1.45] [1.48] [1.57] [1.74] [1.63] [1.88] [1.15] [1.60] [1.13]
Voting with U.S. (t-1) 1.519** 1.524** 1.674** 0.996 1.510** 1.933** 1.491* 1.583* 1.220* 1.529** 0.054
[2.03] [2.04] [2.18] [1.33] [2.02] [2.45] [1.93] [1.93] [1.68] [2.04] [0.06]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.005
[0.40]
Population growth (t-1) 0.000
[0.01]












Dependent variable (t-1) 0.035***
[5.70]
Constant -9.390*** -7.544*** -5.019** -8.350*** -9.582*** -9.010*** -9.279*** -5.645** -8.89*** -9.441*** -6.215
[4.06] [3.31] [2.04] [3.70] [3.91] [3.90] [3.96] [2.22] [4.05] [3.93] [0.42]
f i x e d /  r a n d o m  e f f e c t s r er er er er er er er er er ef e
Observations 823 826 767 767 826 826 826 717 826 826 934
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 6 36 36 06 06 36 36 35 46 36 37 6
Wald test (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
All regressions include year fixed effects.
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%




5.2 A potential transmission channel of fiscal decentralization  
As shortly described in the theory section above, decentralization may reduce terror because it 
makes the political system and the polity more stable (‘system stability hypothesis’) and thus 
more immune against the negative effects of transnational terrorist acts, decreasing terrorists’ 
expected benefit. Alternatively, decentralization may simply yield efficiency gains and 
improve effectiveness in the provision of ‘public safety’, increasing the terrorists’ expected   27
costs, so that our measure of general decentralization only approximates the cost structure of 
providing public goods (‘efficiency hypothesis’).  
In Table 3, we provide a preliminary test for the second potential transmission channel 
of the beneficial impact of fiscal decentralization, augmenting our baseline model with two 
measures of government production efficiency and effectiveness: first, we employ an 
indicator of bureaucratic quality, obtained from the International Country Risk Guide’s 
(ICRG) Political Risk database, for the years 1984 to 2005. Second, we use a measure of 
government effectiveness, available from the year 1996 onwards, and constructed by 
Kaufman et al. (2004). The first measure is based on information on subjective evaluations of 
"autonomy from political pressure," "strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes 
in policy or interruptions in government services" when governments change, and 
"established mechanisms for recruiting and training" (PRS Group 1998). Government 
effectiveness measures the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service 
delivery, based on a substantial number of perceptions-based indicators from various surveys 
on government swiftness of response, efficiency and effectiveness in meeting local and 
national demands, mostly based on information collected from internationally working 
businessmen and managers (Kaufman et al. 2004).
41 For both measures, higher values indicate 
better bureaucratic control or more government effectiveness, respectively.  
If the ‘efficiency hypothesis’ holds, the inclusion of either direct measure of 
government efficiency would arguably reduce the effects of fiscal decentralization – in terms 
of coefficient size and/or its statistical significance. Clearly, however, our measures of 
                                                 
41 The public goods production evaluated by Kaufman et al. (2004) includes, for example, tax collection, 
effective implementation of national policies and government decisions, coordination between government tiers, 
civil service and quality of bureaucracy, and national infrastructure (telecommunication, electricity, 
transportation), response to natural disasters, government personnel quality, issues of institutional rigidity, 
government stability and policy consistency, trust in police, and quality of public schools.    28
government quality are crude, so the deck is stacked against the effectiveness hypothesis. As 
such, the results that follow are preliminary and have to be interpreted with caution.  
Table 3 shows the baseline regressions of columns 1 and 2 of Table 1, augmented with 
the two measures of government effectiveness and reduction of bureaucratic waste. For 
comparison, Table 3 also contains the baseline model excluding measures of government 
efficiency, estimated for the identical regression subsample (columns 2, 4 and 6, 8). This 
subsample is substantially smaller than the one used for the original model of Table 1 above, 
due to missing data. Again, in all models fiscal decentralization is negatively related to the 
occurrence of transnational terror events. Columns 1 and 3 show that improved government 
quality measured by the ICRG index significantly reduces transnational terror (at the five 
percent level). The insignificance of the Kaufman index of government effectiveness in 
columns 5 and 7 might be due to the substantially smaller regression sample, excluding all 
observations prior to 1996 (and thus most of our original sample). As in Table 1, the inclusion 
of local political autonomy, which itself is not significant at conventional levels, does not 
qualitatively alter these main results throughout (columns 3, 4 and 7, 8).  
Turning to the effect of fiscal decentralization, the coefficients of our decentralization 
measures become marginally insignificant when the Kaufmann index is included (columns 5 
through 8). However, in all regressions shown in Table 3 the negative sign remains. 
Obviously, the smaller sample size is an obstacle to identifying significant effects. In contrast, 
for the ICRG index, in the somewhat larger samples with about 500 observations (columns 1 
through 4), the impact of fiscal decentralization is either significant at conventional levels or 
only marginally insignificant. In addition, the coefficients of decentralization are similar 
across models including and excluding government effectiveness. Calculating the marginal 
effects for fiscal decentralization reveals the same picture. Also note that the levels of 
significance are not substantially lower as compared to the original model in Table 1 above.  
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Table 3: Potential transmission channel of decentralization, NBR, 1976-2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bureaucratic quality (t-1) -0.116** -0.116**
[2.47] [2.30]
Gov. effectiveness (t-1) -0.501 -0.65
[0.95] [1.03]
Political autonomy 0.106 0.034 0.061 0.03
[0.33] [0.10] [0.08] [0.04]
Fiscal decentralization (t-1) -0.017 -0.021* -0.024** -0.029** -0.031 -0.035 -0.033 -0.038
[1.50] [1.84] [2.02] [2.42] [1.42] [1.58] [1.23] [1.45]
marginal effect -0.02 -0.026 -0.026 -0.034 -0.01 -0.011 -0.01 -0.012
fiscal decentralization 
(log) GDP per capita (t-1) 0.288* 0.15 0.324** 0.196 0.523 0.164 0.621 0.146
[1.87] [1.02] [1.99] [1.25] [1.09] [0.58] [1.09] [0.46]
(log) Population (t-1) 0.626*** 0.604*** 0.614*** 0.599*** 0.754*** 0.735*** 0.790*** 0.781***
[5.43] [5.07] [4.64] [4.37] [3.54] [3.52] [3.08] [3.09]
Political freedom (t-1) 0.104 0.098 0.105 0.11 -0.036 -0.068 -0.01 -0.016
[1.20] [1.12] [1.12] [1.18] [0.16] [0.32] [0.04] [0.06]
Political freedom, change -0.209 -0.19 -0.234 -0.209 -0.913 -0.996 -0.899 -1.007
[1.27] [1.19] [1.37] [1.25] [1.49] [1.64] [1.38] [1.54]
Government fractionalization (t-1) 0.886*** 0.930*** 0.680** 0.690** 0.5 0.469 0.179 0.048
[2.85] [2.97] [2.05] [2.03] [0.61] [0.57] [0.19] [0.05]
Voting with U.S. (t-1) 2.320** 1.533* 2.614** 1.861* 4.457* 4.811* 4.766 5.292*
[2.42] [1.67] [2.57] [1.89] [1.74] [1.94] [1.52] [1.76]
Constant -11.529*** -10.682*** -13.267*** -10.909*** -3.967 -1.539 -3.028 -1.416
[4.59] [4.23] [4.57] [3.70] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 517 517 463 463 149 149 136 136
Number of countries 58 58 49 49 48 48 43 43
Wald test (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
All regressions include year fixed effects.
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Regressions in columns 2, 4, 6, 8 are based on the regression samples in regressions 1, 3, 5 and 7, respectively.  




In summary, to the extent that our crude measures of governance reflect governments’ 
effectiveness in the provision of public safety, we do not find that the impact of 
decentralization on terror is mediated by effectiveness. While these estimates have to be 
interpreted with some caution, our results are not in favour of the ‘government efficiency 
hypothesis’. While the persisting beneficial effects of decentralization might thus be due to 
the ‘system stability hypothesis’ proposed by Frey and Luechinger (2004), we lack the data to 
directly test for this transmission channel. 
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6. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper empirically analyzes the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of 
transnational terror using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-
2000. We find that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of terror events in a target 
country, while political decentralization has no impact. In the words of Keman (2000), we 
find the ‘power to act (= spend)’ to matter more than the ‘power to decide’ for the occurrence 
of transnational terrorism.  
Distinguishing decentralization of policy implementation from decentralization of 
political decision-making – as suggested by Frey and Luechinger (2004) – our empirical 
analysis suggests that effective local government administrations (potentially taking over 
responsibilities from other dysfunctioning local or supra-local administrations) are more 
important in stabilizing a country than the dispersion of actual decision-making authority at 
the local level. Local spending autonomy may simply increase competition among 
jurisdictions, thereby improving the quality of ‘security’. Our preliminary attempt to 
empirically control for government quality shows no support for the ‘efficiency hypothesis’. 
However, given the lack of more reliable data, these additional results have to be interpreted 
with caution. 
Our main results bear important policy implications. Since the seminal work of Becker 
(1968), economists view undertaking criminal acts as the outcome of rational decision-
making. Applying this rational choice model of criminal behavior to terrorists’ decisions, 
additional terror will occur when the expected benefit of an additional terrorist act outweighs 
its costs. Indeed, it has been shown that the propensity to commit terrorist acts can be 
influenced by changes in external costs and benefits (Enders and Sandler 1995). Traditional 
strategies for combating terror aim at raising the direct or opportunity costs of committing 
such acts. In contrast, particularly in light of failing deterrence strategies, more recent   31
approaches focus on reducing the (expected) benefits of terrorist activity (Lichbach 1987, 
Frey 1988, Wilkinson 2002, Sandler and Enders 2004).  
In this paper, we have shown that greater expenditure decentralization might be one 
instrument to influence terrorists’ costs-benefit-calculus, reducing the occurrence of 
transnational terror. Previous research has argued that decentralized spending competences 
lead to inefficient overspending and create problems of coordination, thereby preventing 
effective security and potentially making a country more attractive for terrorist activity. As we 
have shown in this paper, on average, the opposite is true: decentralization reduces 
transnational terror. We conclude that decentralizing government spending might be 
beneficial to public safety, positively contributing to individual welfare, so that some policy 
makers’ calls for greater centralization in the ‘fight against terrorism’ should be treated with 
caution. 
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Appendix 
Descriptions and sources 
Variable Definition Source
Number of terror events Number of transnational terror events for each country and year, 
defined as “violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an 
atmosphere of fear and alarm.”
MIPT Terrorism 
Knowledge Base
Fiscal decentralization Total expenditure of sub-national government tiers divided by total 
spending by all levels of government.
IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics
Political autonomy Under the constitution, subnational legislatures have autonomy in 
certain specified areas--i.e. constitutional authority to legislate--not 
explicitly subject to central laws.
Treisman (2008)
Strong or residual autonomy Under the constitution, subnational governments have residual 
powers (to legislate on areas not explicitly assigned to other levels). 
Treisman (2008)
(log) GDP per capita Gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Data are in 
constant U.S. dollars.
World Bank (2006)
(log) Population Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, 
which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship, 
except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum.
World Bank (2006)
Political freedom Average value of political rights and civil liberties, ranging from -7 to 
-1, where higher values reflect greater freedom. 
Freedom House (2005)
Political freedom, change Yearly change in index ranging from 1 to 7, where higher values 
reflect greater freedom. 
Freedom House (2005)
Government fractionalization Probability that two deputies picked at random from among the 
government parties will be of different parties( low(0)-high(1)).
Beck et al. (2001)
Voting with U.S. Votes in agreement with the US are coded as 1, votes in disagreement 
as 0, and abstentions or absences as 0.5. The resulting numbers are 
then divided by the total number of votes in each country and year. 
Dreher and Sturm (2006)
GDP growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. 
dollars. 
World Bank (2006)
Population growth Annual population growth rate, based on the de facto definition of 
population.
World Bank (2006)
New state, index The timing of national independence (0 if before 1914; 1 if between 
1914 and 1945; 2 if between 1946 and 1989; and 3 if after 1989).
Gallup et al. (2001)
War, dummy Dummy for countries that had external war over the period 1960-85. Gallup et al. (2001)
Ethnic fractionalization Fractionalizationj=, 
with sij being the share of group i in country j.
Alesina et al. (2003)
Language fractionalization Fractionalizationj=, 
with sij being the share of group i in country j.
Alesina et al. (2003)
Religious fractionalization Fractionalizationj=, 
with sij being the share of group i in country j.
Alesina et al. (2003)
Opposition fractionalization Probability that two deputies picked at random from among the 
opposition parties will be of different parties( low(0)-high(1)).
Beck et al. (2001)
Bureaucratic quality Index of bureaucratic quality on a scale of 1-12, with higher values 
indicating higher quality. Includes aspects of autonomy from political 
pressure, ability to govern without interruptions in government 
services when governments change, and established mechanisms for 
recruiting and training of personnel.
PRS Group (1998)
Government effectiveness ‘Government effectiveness’ component of the Kaufman governance 
quality indicator of 1998. According to Kaufman et al. (2003), this 
indicator is based on a regression with data from various distinct 
sources and reflects the quality of public service provision and of the 
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of 
the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to policies. The main focus of this index 
is on “inputs” required for the government to be able to produce and 
implement good policies and deliver public goods. The value of the 
index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5.
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Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of terror events 1.70 4.59 0.00 50.00
Fiscal decentralization 20.84 13.48 1.45 55.62
Political (strong) autonomy  (1911 obs) 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Residual autonomy  (1886 obs) 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Strong or residual autonomy  (1911 obs) 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
(log) GDP per capita 7.51 1.53 4.31 10.64
(log) Population 15.95 1.61 12.29 20.95
Political freedom -3.66 1.97 -7.00 -1.00
Political freedom, change 0.03 0.46 -4.00 3.50
Government fractionalization 0.20 0.29 0.00 1.00
Voting with U.S. 0.30 0.15 0.06 0.84
GDP growth 3.08 5.79 -51.03 38.20
Population growth 1.73 1.44 -16.55 18.71
New state, index 1.25 1.03 0.00 3.00
War, dummy 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Ethnic fractionalization 0.43 0.26 0.00 0.93
Language fractionalization 0.39 0.29 0.00 0.92
Religious fractionalization 0.41 0.25 0.00 0.86
Opposition fractionalization 0.49 0.29 0.00 1.00
Bureaucratic quality 8.71 2.99 2 12
Government effectiveness 0.68 0.89 -0.965 2.16  
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